We study private information retrieval (PIR) on coded data with possibly colluding servers. Devising PIR schemes with optimal download rate in the case of collusion and coded data is still open in general. We provide a lifting operation that can transform what we call one-shot PIR schemes for two messages into schemes for any number of messages. We apply this lifting operation on existing PIR schemes and describe two immediate implications. First, we obtain novel PIR schemes with improved download rate in the case of MDS coded data and server collusion. Second, we provide a simplified description of existing optimal PIR schemes on replicated data as lifted secret sharing based PIR.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of designing private information retrieval (PIR) schemes on coded data stored on multiple servers that can possibly collude. In this setting, a user wants to download a message from a server with M messages while revealing no information, in an information-theoretic sense, about which message it is interested in. The database is replicated on N servers, or in general, could be stored using an erasure code, typically a Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code.These servers could possibly collude to gain information about the identity of the user's retrieved message.
The PIR problem was first introduced and studied in [1] , [2] and was followed up by a large body of work (e.g. [3] - [8] ). The model there assumes the database to be replicated and focuses on PIR schemes with efficient total communication rate, i.e., upload and download. Motivated by big data applications and recent advances in the theory of codes for distributed storage, there has been a growing interest in designing PIR schemes that can query data that is stored in coded form and not just replicated. For this setting, the assumption has been that the messages being retrieved are very large (compared to the queries) and therefore the focus has been on designing PIR schemes that minimize the download rate. Despite significant recent progress, the problem of characterizing the optimal PIR download rate (called PIR capacity) in the case of coded data and server collusion remains open in general. Related work: When the data is replicated, the problem of finding the PIR capacity, i.e., minimum download rate, is essentially solved. It was shown in [4] and [5] that the PIR capacity is (1+T /N +T 2 /N 2 +· · ·+T M −1 /N M −1 ) −1 , where N is the number of servers, T is the number of colluding This work was supported in part by NSF Grant CCF 1817635. servers and M is the number of messages. Capacity achieving PIR schemes were also presented in [4] and [5] .
When the data is coded and stored on a large number of servers (exponential in the number of messages), it was shown in [9] that downloading one extra bit is enough to achieve privacy. In [10] , the authors derived bounds on the tradeoff between storage cost and download cost for linear coded data and studied properties of PIR schemes on MDS data. Explicit constructions of efficient PIR scheme on MDS data were first presented in [11] for both collusions and no collusions. Improved PIR schemes for MDS coded data with collusions were presented in [12] . PIR schemes for general linear codes, not necessarily MDS, were studied in [13] . The PIR capacity for MDS coded data and no collusion was determined in [14] , and remains unknown for the case of collusions.
Contributions:
We introduce what we refer to as a lifting operation that transforms a class of one-shot linear PIR schemes that can retrieve privately one out of a total of two messages, into general PIR schemes on any number of messages.
In the literature, the majority of PIR schemes on coded data, such as those in [11] and [12] , are one-shot schemes. First, we describe a refinement operation on these schemes that improves their rate for two messages. Then, we describe how the refined version can be lifted to any number of messages. Finally, we apply the lifting operation on existing PIR schemes and describe two immediate implications:
• Applying the lifting operation to the schemes presented in [11] and [12] , we obtain novel PIR schemes with improved download rate for MDS coded data and server collusion. • The capacity achieving PIR schemes on replicated data in [4] and [5] can be seen as lifted secret sharing.
II. SETTING
A set of M messages, {W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W M } ⊆ F L q , are stored into N servers each using an (N, K)-MDS code. We denote by W j i ∈ F L/K q , the data about W j stored on server i.
The data on server i is
A linear query (from now on we omit the term linear) is a vector q ∈ F M L/K q . When a user sends a query q to a server i, this server answers back with the inner product D i , q ∈ F q .
The problem of private information retrieval can be stated informally as follows: A user wishes to download a file W m without leaking any information about m to any of the servers where at most T of them collude. The goal is for the user to achieve this while minimizing the download rate.
The messages W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W M are assumed to be independent and uniformly distributed elements of F L q . The user is interested in a message W m . The index of this message, m, is chosen uniformly at random from the set {1, 2, . . . , M }.
A PIR scheme is a set of queries for each possible desired message W m . We denote a scheme by
. . , Q m N } is the set of queries which the user will make to each server when they wish to retrieve W m . So, if the user is interested in W m , Q m i denotes the set of queries sent to server i. The set of answers,
A PIR scheme should satisfy two properties:
, |J| = T . Correctness guarantees that the user will be able to retrieve the message they are interested in. T -Privacy guarantees that no T colluding servers will gain any information on the message in which the user is interested. Note that T -Privacy implies in |Q 1 | = |Q i | for every i, i.e., the number of queries does not depend on the desired message.
III. ONE-SHOT SCHEMES
In this section we introduce the notion of a one-shot scheme. The majority of the schemes in the literature are of this type.
Without loss of generality, throughout this text, we assume that the user is interested in retrieving the first message.
We denote by
, the set of queries which only query the first message. Definition 3. An (N, K, T, M )-one-shot PIR scheme of codimension r is an (N, K, T, M )-PIR scheme where each server is queried exactly once and in the following way. The queries in Table I satisfy the following properties: 1) Any collection of T queries from q 1 , . . . , q N ∈ F M L/K q are uniformly and independently distributed.
2) The a 1 , . . . , a N −r ∈ V 1 are such that the responses D r+1 , a 1 , . . . , D N , a N −r are linearly independent.
3) For i > r, the response D i , q i is a linear combination of D 1 , q 1 , . . . , D r , q r .
Property 1 ensures privacy. Properties 2 and 3 ensure correctness.
Proposition 1. Let Q be an (N, K, T, M )-one-shot scheme of co-dimension r. Then its rate is given by
Technically, N − r must be divisible by L. When this does not occur, the one-shot scheme must be repeated lcm(N −r, L) times 1 . This, however, does not change the rate of the scheme.
We present an example of a one-shot scheme from [11] .
Example 1. Suppose the messages are stored using a (4, 2)-MDS code over F 3 in the following way:
Suppose the user is interested in the first message and wants 2-privacy, i.e., at most 2 servers can collude. The following is a (4, 2, 2, M )-one-shot scheme taken from [11] . The queries in Table II satisfy the following properties:
• The queries q 1 , q 2 ∈ F M L/K q are uniformly and independently distributed. • We have q 3 = q 1 + q 2 and q 4 = q 1 + 2q 2 . • The query e 1 ∈ V 1 is the first vector of the standard basis of F M L/K q , i.e, e 1 only has entry 1 in the first coordinate and 0 on all the other coordinates. This scheme is private since for any two servers the queries are uniformly and independently distributed.
To retrieve D 4 , e 1 the user uses the following identity:
With this we have one linear combination of W 1 , the first coordinate of W 1 1 + W 1 2 . Repeating this lcm(N − r, L) times, we obtain enough combinations to decode W 1 .
To retrieve 1 unit of the message the user has to download 4 units. Therefore, the rate of the PIR scheme is R = 1/4, which could have also been obtained from Proposition 1.
IV. THE REFINEMENT LEMMA
The rate of a one-shot scheme is independent of the number of messages. In this section, we show how to refine a one-shot scheme to obtain a better rate for the case of two messages.
Analogous to V 1 , we denote by
the set of queries which only query the second message.
Lemma 1 (The Refinement Lemma). Let Q be a one-shot scheme of co-dimension r, with rate N −r N . Then, there exists an (N, K, T, 2)-PIR scheme, Q , with rate R Q = N N +r > N −r N . Proof. We construct Q in the following way. The queries in Table III satisfy the following properties:
Privacy is inherited from the one-shot scheme by randomizing the order in which the queries to a server are sent.
The following is also inherited from the one-shot scheme: For i > r, D i , b i is a linear combination of D 1 , b 1 , . . . , D r , b r . Thus, the user can retrieve the linearly independent D 1 , a 1 , . . . , D N , a N .
Example 2. Consider Example 1 but with two messages.
Applying the refinement lemma, we get the following scheme. of Table II. The queries in Table IV satisfy To retrieve D 4 , a 4 we use the following identity (inherited from Equation 1 in the one-shot scheme):
The choice a 4 = a 1 + 3a 2 is done so that the set of responses D 1 , a 1 , . . . , D 4 , a 4 is linearly independent.
As per Lemma 1, the rate of this scheme is R = 4/7, larger than the rate of 1/4 in Example 1.
Remark 1. The scheme in Example 1 is defined over the field F 3 . However, the refinement of this scheme in Example 2 requires a larger field since we need the coefficient 3 in a 4 = a 1 + 3a 2 so that the set { D 1 , a 1 , . . . , D 4 , a 4 } is linearly independent. In our schemes, we will assume that the base field is large enough.
V. LIFTING FROM TWO TO ANY NUMBER OF MESSAGES
In this section, we present our main result in Theorem 1. We show how to extend, by means of a lifting operation, the refined scheme on two messages to any number of messages. Informally, the lifting operation consists of two steps: a symmetrization, and a way of dealing with "leftover" queries that result from the symmetrization.
We also introduce a symbolic matrix representation for PIR schemes which simplifies our analysis.
A. An Example of the Lifting Operation
the set of queries which only query the j-th message. So, for example, if a ∈ V 1 , b ∈ V 2 , and c ∈ V 3 , then a is a 1-query, a + b is a 2-query, and a + b + c is a 3-query.
Consider the scheme in Example 2. We represent this scheme by means of the following matrix:
Each column of S 2 corresponds to a server. A 1 in column i represents sending all possible combinations of 1-queries of every message to server i and a 2 represents sending all combinations of 2-queries of every message to server i. We call this matrix the symbolic matrix of the scheme.
The co-dimension r = 3 tells us that for every r = 3 ones there is N − r = 1 twos in the symbolic matrix.
Given the interpretation above, the symbolic matrix S 2 can be readily applied to obtain a PIR scheme for any number of messages M . For M = 3, it gives the following PIR scheme. The queries in Table V satisfy the following properties:
• The a's and b's are chosen as in Example 2.
• The c's are chosen analogously to the b's. • The extra term b 5 + c 5 is chosen uniformly and independent and different from zero. The scheme in Table V has rate 5/12. In this scheme, the role of b 5 + c 5 is to achieve privacy and does not contribute to the decoding process. In this sense, it can be seen as a "leftover" query of the symmetrization. By repeating the scheme r = 3 times, each one shifted to the left, so that the "leftover" queries appear in different servers, we can use the same idea as in the one-shot scheme to improve the rate from 5/12 to 16/37. The queries in Table VI satisfy the following properties:
• The scheme is separated into four blocks. • In each of the first three blocks the queries behave as previously, but shifted to the left so that the "leftover" queries appear in different servers. In this way, D 1 , a 16 can be retrieved using the following identity (analogous to Example 2):
This scheme can be represented by the following matrix 4 .
The scheme for M = 3 messages was constructed recursively using the one for 2 messages. It is this recursive operation that we call lifting. The main idea behind the lifting operation is that r = 3 entries with value k generate N −r = 1 entries with value k + 1 in the symbolic matrix.
Lifting S 3 to S 4 follows the same procedure: repeat S 3 r = 3 times, each one shifted to the left, to produce N −r = 1 4-query. As a result, we obtain the following symbolic matrix.
The queries are to be chosen analogously to the previous examples which we describe rigorously in the next subsection.
B. The Symbolic Matrix and the Lifting Operation
Let Q be a one-shot scheme with co-dimension r. A symbolic matrix S M for Q is defined recursively as follows.
The lifting operation is defined as,
where σ(S M ) shifts the columns of S M to the left and A is a matrix which we will describe later in detail.
is the entry in the i-row and j-th column of the matrix σ(S M ).
The matrix A is constructed as follows: We first define an ordering 5 , ≺, on (i, j) ∈ N 2 by (i, j) ≺ (i , j ) if either i < i or i = i and j < j .
where rows(S M ) is the number of rows in S M . Define the auxiliary sets
Then A is defined as
Translation from symbolic matrix to PIR scheme. Each entry k of a symbolic matrix S M represents M k k-queries, one on every combination of k messages. The queries are taken analogously to the queries in the one-shot scheme. This is done by making the r queries represented by
To find the rate of the lifted scheme we need to count the number of entries in the symbolic matrix of a specific value. Proposition 2. Let S M be the symbolic matrix of a one-shot scheme with co-dimension r. Then,
Let Q be a one-shot scheme of co-dimension r.
Then, there exists an (N, K, T, M )-PIR scheme Q with rate
Proof. Given the one shot-scheme Q we apply the refinement lemma to obtain a scheme with symbolic matrix S 2 as in Equation 2. The scheme Q is defined as the one with symbolic matrix S M = lift M −2 (S 2 ) as in Equation 3 . Privacy and correctness of the scheme follows directly from the privacy and correctness of the one-shot scheme. Next, we calculate the rate R Q = L |Q 1 | . Each entry k of S M corresponds to M k k-queries, one for each combination of k messages. Thus, using Proposition 2,
To find L we need to count the queries which query W 1 . The number of k-queries which query W 1 is 
VI. APPLICATIONS OF THE LIFTING OPERATION
In this section, we put the lifting operation into action and apply it to known one-shot schemes from the literature.
We first refine and lift the scheme in [11] . In our notation, this scheme is a one-shot scheme with r = N K−N +T K . Theorem 2. Refining and lifting the scheme presented in [11] , we obtain an (N, K, T, M )-PIR scheme, Q, with
Next, we refine and lift the scheme in [12] . In our notation, this scheme has co-dimension r = K + T − 1. Thus, we obtain the first PIR scheme to achieve the rate conjectured to be optimal 6 in [12] for MDS coded data with collusions. 6 This conjecture was disproven in [15] for some parameters. Now, we consider the case of replicated data (K = 1) on T colluding servers. A T -threshold linear secret sharing scheme [16] can be transformed into the following one-shot scheme. Server 1 . . . Server T Server T + 1 . . . Server N q 1 q T q T +1 + a 1 q N + a N −T Theorem 4. Refining and lifting a T -threshold linear secret sharing scheme, we obtain an (N, 1, T, M )-PIR scheme, Q, with capacity-achieving rate
. This scheme has the same capacity achieving rate as the scheme presented in [5] but with less queries.
